out the 19 7 0s, the relative impact of weekly mnoney "surprises" on short-term interest rates has been greater since the October 1979 change in monetary control procedures. In fact, over 25 percent of the volatility of the 3-month Treasury bill rate during the time period of the money supply announcement can be attributed directly to the increased volatility of unanticipated weekly changes in money since October 1979.Ñ oreover, unanticipated money supply changes that lie outside the Federal Reserve's announced money growth range appear to have a relatively greater effect on interest rates than money surprises falling within the announced growth range. 4
The evidence clearly indicates that unanticipated changes in the money stock have an important effect on interest rates. Consequently, examining the characteristics of the mommey supply forecasts that give rise to such behavior is important. Several studies have examined the weekly money supply forecasts for the period prior to October 1979; hnt little has been done on comparing the forecasts across the announced change in monetary control procedures.°The purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of the October Ummiversity, F'ehruarv 1982: processed) . Role', "rime Re- spouse of Slmom't-'fermn lmmterest Rates," provides sommme evidence 0mm this issue for time pem 'iod Feimrmmarv 1980 to Novemher 1981 1979 clmammge in monetary commtroi 0mm time weekly money time change in motmetarv commtrol procedures affected supply forecasts. Under the assumption of rational expectations, a change fromn one recognized monetary control procedum-e to another should have mmo effect 0mm the forecast characteristics.
6 In other words, a change from one monetary control procedure to another should not affect the unbiased and efficiency aspects of the forecasts. IE however, the new procedure is not "well-defined" -that is, the rules of the gamne are changing constantly -then weekly money supply forecasts may appear biased and inefficient.' 5%]IAT DO.ES "RATIONALITY" 15IPLY?
The theory of rational expectations is based on the premise that market participants construct forecasts of the futtire in a manner that fully reflects the relevant information available to them. Because wealth-maximizing individuals will not make forecasts that are continually wrong in the same direction, the rational expectations approach suggests that forecasts of economic phenomena should be unbiased. Moreover, if the forecast errors could uot have been reduced by using other available information, then forecasters have efficiently utilized the relevant data at their disposal the unbiased and efficiency characteristics of time weekly money supply forecasts? If time fbrccasts from time post-October 1979 period are not dilferent thaim those fromn before, we timeim would conchmde timat tile forecasters have adapted to the new policy regime. If they differ, however, the evidence would not reject the hypothesis that they have been unable to ascertain the polic~maker'sbehavioral rule. 8
Three sample periods are used in time following analysis. The full period is from the week ending January 11, 1978 , totheweekeudingJune 16,1982 . Giventhe change in operating procedures in late 1979, the relevant subperiods are from the week ending January 11, 1978, to the week ending October 3, 1979, and from the week ending October 10, 1979, to the week ending June 16, 1982.°With these sample periods, the unbiased and efficiency characteristics of the weekly money snppiy forecasts across the change in monetary control procedures can be investigated.
Weekly Mon.eq Supply Data
The nmoney data series used in this article are the actual and expected, initially announced week-toThe issue investigated here is whether the weekly forecasts of the Ml money stock change have been affected noticeably by the October 1979 change in monetary control procedures. More specifically, the question asked is: assuming rational expectations, has (trhe concept of rational expectations is based on the belief that ee0000mic agents are utility maximizers. hums, mnarket participammts form expectations that fully reflect all available immfonmuation, More formally, rational expectations imnply that individuals' subjective probability distribution of possible outcomes is identical to the objective probability-distm'ibmitiomms that actually occur. Commse-(lmiemitlY, the ommiy way policymakers can afl~etbehavior is to "fool" the people in an immeonsistent manner. This eommcept is developed more fully' imm John F, Muth, "Ratiommal Expectatiomms amid here AM~is the actual change in the money stock, 1 SM~"is the expectation held in period t-1 for the change in the money stock in period t, and Em 15 a random error term with zero mean and variance o'~.
To test for the absence of bias, equation 1 is rewritten and estimated as (2)~= a 0
here a 0 and Pm are the parameters to be estimated. ma In this form, the weekly money forecasts are tmnbiased predictors of actual money supply changes if the joint hypothesis that &ç~= 0 and 13 m = 1 cannot be rejected.
Moreover, the estimated residuals frommm this regression (~~) should not exhibit serial correlation if the forecasts are unbiased predictions of the actual change in money. Table 1 presents the regression results from estimating equation 2 using the expected and actual money stock changes. The full-period results suggest that the forecasts of weekly changes in the money stock are unbiased predictors of the actual chamiges. The calcuiated F-statistic does not exceed the criticai value of 3,04 at the 5 percent significance level. Consequently, the null joint hypothesis that &o = 0 and Pm = 1 is not rejected. Moreover, the residuals ofthe equation show no indication of first-order serial correlation, as evidenced by the Dnrbin-Watson statistic. Thus, the weekly money supply forecasts appear to be unbiased across the ftmil sample, To see if the forecasts are unbiased before and after the October 1979 change in monetary control procedures, equatiomm 2 was re-estimated for the two periods January11, 1978 , to October 3, 1979 , and October 10, 1979 , to June 16, 1982 , These regression results also are reported in table 1. i3
The estimates from the pre-October 1979 period again indicate that the forecasts are unbiased. The calcuiated F-statistic is not statistically significant, and the Durbin-Watson statistic again indicates no firstorder seriai correlation amommg the residuals. In contrast, the post-October 1979 regression results permit us to reject the hypothesis that the forecasts are unbiased predictors of the actuai changes. Although the estimated constant term is statistically insignificant, the hypothesis that the estimated slope term (Pm) does not differ from unity is rejected easiiy (t = 2,33), Conseqtientiy, the joint hypothesis underlying this 50 1t has been argued that survey data are not good measures of the market's expectations ofsomue macroeconomic vam-iahle. This arguument is Foonded on the belief that most sun-ey m-espondents are not actual mnarket partieipammts. 1mm other words, their responses to the survey are not based on some proflt-maxinuzing behavior timat has generated the forecast, The weekly mnoney forecasts used here are taken from dealers actively partieipatimig in the financial mar- The efficiency condition requires that forecasts fully reflect all pertinent and readily available information. " Since the information available to individuals includes the past history ofthe series being forecast, it is possible to test the hypothesis that the forecasts are "weakly" efficient; that is, at least the information contained in the history of weekly money supply changes is used efficiently. This concept of efficiency requires that the process actually generating observed changes in weekly money and the process generating the forecasts of these chammges are the same. The simplest process to assume is an autoregressive one, where observed and expected changes are generated solely by the past history of the series itself. Mathematically, this concept of efficiency can he stated as cates timat serial correlation is not present among the residuals. Thus. for the full period, we cammmmot reject time hypothesis that forecasters efficiently used the information contained in past chammges iii the money stock in forming their predictions.
We mmext test the efficiency hypothesis for the preammd post-October 1979 periods; timese emnpirical results also are found in table 2. 1mm both instances, we again cannot reject the hypothesis that past information about weekly money changes was used efficiently. Neither F-statistic is significammt at the 5 percent level, Based on these results, therefore, the weak-form efficiency hypothesis is not rejected by the data, regardless of the sample used. 
Tests of Stronger-Form Efficiency
The above evidence suggests that forecasts ofweekly money stock changes are weakly efficient. Efficiency, however, also may be considered in a broader sense. This broader efficiency criterion requires that forecasts incorporate all of the relev~mtand available information. Thus, similar to the previous hypothesis, efficiency in the broad sense reqmmires that the forecast errors be orthogonal, or systematically unrelated to all relevant available information sets.
To test this concept of efficiency, we estimate the
where l~_refers to lagged values (i = 0, 1,..., n) of information that are not incorporated in past money stock changes, and w 1 is another randonm error term. The analysis is intended to determine whether the survey respondent's weekly errors in forecasting money supply changes can be explained by some set(s) of information that are readily available. If the esti- It is, ofcourse, impossible to account for every imaginable information set that each forecaster could have used. Consequently, we analyze several sets of information that are available on a timely basis and are potentially useful in estimating future money stock developments. The informmmation sets used are consumer and industrial loans, demand deposits at large weekly reporting banks, float and the adjusted monetary base as defined by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In all cases, the data used are taken from origin-al Federal Reserve statistical releases that were available to forecasters prior to the weekly money stock announcements.~' Although we realize that the series moAn data am-c imi terms oflevel ctmammges from the previous week. Data sources are the Federal Reserve H4. 1 and H4,2 statistical releases, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, This procedure ma" imupart somiie measnm'ement error since omily the initially released data are used, Civen the short time horizomi used and the observation that the weekly data m'evisions arc mmot severe, the approach used seemns sufficient. It also slmouid be noted that, since February 1980, data on cormsunmer amid indimstrial ioamis and demand deposits at weekly reporting hammks have been released comacurrently with the money supply numbers, Thus, these two series offer no prior informatiomm durirmg the postchosen do not exhaust the set of possible information sources, they are sufficiently broad to test the hypothesis at hand. Table 3 reports the calculated F-statistics from estimating equation 6 using the different informatiorm sets. In each test, the information set contains contemmmporaneous and four lagged terms. The outcome for the full period suggests that forecasters efficiently utilized the infornmation contained in the float information set: the reported F-statistic is not large enough to reject the null hypothesis. The results for the other information sets -consumer and industrial loans, demand deposits at large weekly reporting banks and the adjusted base -reject the efficiency hypothesis. For these, the F-statistics exceed the 5 percent critical value (2.26), implying that forecast errors could have been lessened if the information contained in these data had been used. the post-October 1979 results reveal that, except for float, the forecasters could have immmproved upon their ability to predict changes in the money stock by incorporating the information contained in the series on loans, demand deposits and the adjusted base. Thus, over the recent period, the forecasts do not meet the broader efficiency criterion tested here.
CONe! USION
Previous examinations of survey data on weekly money supply forecasts have focused primarily on the effects of unanticipated money changes on market interest rates. Although several studies have examined the forecasts' rationality, there has been no systematic investigation into the effect of the change in monetary control procedures on the unbiased and efficiency characteristics of the forecasts.
The evidence presented here indicates that the change in control procedures has had a significant effect on the characteristics of weekly money supply forecasts. Prior to October 1979, the forecasts of the change in the weekly money stock were unbiased and efficient. In contrast, weekly money forecasts since October 1979 have been biased and inefficient.
The results of this investigation lend support to the recently suggested hypothesis that, since October 1979, "market participants [have] concluded that the rules under which monetary policy is conducted could no longer be considered constant." 2°I f this indeed is true, then the combined evidence from this study and those dealing with the interest rate effects of unanticipated money supply changes suggests that a more predictable control procedure would contribute to a more stable financial market.
